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Abstract 
I propose the purpose our concept of actual causation serves is minimizing various cost in 
intervention practice. Actual causation has three features: non-redundant sufficiency, 
continuity and abnormality; these features correspond to the minimization of exploitative 
cost, exploratory cost and risk cost in intervention practice. Incorporating these three features, 
a definition of actual causation is given. I  test the definition in 66 causal cases from actual 
causation literature and show that this definition’ application fit intuition better than some 
other causal modelling based definitions. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 In the literature of actual causation, a question has been frequently asked: why do 
we possess this particular concept of actual causation? what kind of purpose does the 
concept of actual causation serve?  Hitchcock and Knobe proposed that  “people’s 
concept of actual causation enables them to design effective interventions ”1, i.e., 
actual causation concept help people to select  the preferable intervention which 
                                                            
1 Hitchcock, C. and Knobe, J. [2009]: ‘Cause and norm’, Journal of Philosophy, 106,p.590. 
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"works by targeting abnormal aspects of the situation and replacing them  with more 
normal ones".2 
 In this paper I  offer a somehow different view of  what kind of interventions are 
preferable:  preferable interventions should satisfy non-redundant sufficiency, 
continuity and abnormality, because in satisfying these features the cost in 
intervention practice is qualitatively minimized.  In the following part of introduction 
section I will explain more about cost in intervention practice. 
In order to achieve some desired goal in real life, we need to make intervention or 
prediction of whether some previous events occurs or not. There are two types of 
these intervention/prediction activities: exploitative ones and exploratory ones. 
No matter whether the goal-pursuing activity is exploitative or exploratory, 
generally the activity would have practical costs, i.e., certain amount of limited 
resource would be consumed during the activity. There are at least four kind of such 
practical cost.3 
(1) Exploitative Cost. Sometimes the goal-pursuing activity is exploitative. People 
manipulate the presence or absence of some previous events to ensure the presence or 
absence of a following event. People collect information of the presence or absence of 
some previous events to predict the presence or absence of a following event. For 
instance, suppose I am to cook an egg for breakfast. I put an egg into boiling water 
and wait to obtain a boiled egg. I observe the flame color and timing to predict how 
tender the cooked egg will be. In short, in order to ensure the occurrence of an 
                                                            
2 Ibd., p.612 
3 In the following sections I will only discuss intervention activities and their relationship to causality. I 
will not discuss prediction activities. 
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exploitative goal event, the agent should intervene with some cause-like event of the 
goal event, and the intervention activities have practical cost. For instance, in order to 
obtain a boiled egg, I do intervention with the egg, and the intervention activity 
consumes some electric energy, water and time. 
(2) Exploratory Costs. Sometimes the goal-pursuing activity is exploitative. The 
goal of the activity is not to achieve a concrete physical outcome such as a cooked 
egg. Rather, the goal is to explore the world and extend our causal knowledge, to 
know more about which event causes some other event. For instance, I may do a 
serial of experiment to find the shortest time required to boil an egg. In this case, the 
goal of my experiments is not to cook a particular egg, but to explore the causal 
relationship between the egg boiling process and the processed egg. In short, in order 
to achieve some exploratory goals, the agent should run some actual or virtual 
experiment trials, and these experimental activities have practical cost. For instance, 
the ‘fastest egg-boiling’ experiment above cost electric energy, water and time. Even 
if the agent merely computes the shortest egg boiling time theoretically but doesn’t 
actually run the experiment, the theoretical process would cost some computing 
resource and time. 
(3)Risk Cost: When we use a specific set of intervention to promote some goal 
event, there is risk that the goal event failed to occur even if the intervention is done. 
For instance, suppose I boil an egg for two minutes and pick it out, it is possible that 
the egg is still in semi-liquid state and uneatable. Then, the bad possibility that the 
boiled egg is uneatable is the risk cost I have to pay for the intervention of boiling the 
egg for two minutes.  
(4) Normative Costs. If the intervention activity violate some practical/moral norm, 
the norm-violation aspect of the activity can be seen as the normative cost of the 
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activity. Suppose My neighbor Jack and I share a kitchen. Only two eggs are left in 
the kitchen and they all belong to Jack. In the morning Jack boiled one for breakfast 
and I boiled the other without notifying jack. If we ask what causes the fact that Jack 
has no egg to use for lunch, we are more inclined to say my action in the morning 
rather than Jack’s is the cause. The reason for this is that my egg-using activity violate 
a practical norm ("Not to use others’ property without permission") and my neighbor's 
activity doesn’t. In this paper I will not further address the issue of normative cost ,but 
simply assume that normative cost can be treated like risk cost is treated. 
Because of the resource-limited nature of the real world, we have good reason to 
minimize the four kind of cost above. The cost minimization can be done either 
qualitatively or quantitatively. 
On the qualitative level, the question is whether a particular set of event is both 
efficient and nonredundant in promoting a following event. Being efficient means 
intervention with this set of events somehow ensure the following event’s occurrence. 
Being nonredundant means that intervention with any subset of this event set doesn’t 
ensure the following event as good as the original set. 
On the quantitative level, for any two efficient and nonredundant intervention set A⃗  
and B⃗  for some goal event e, if quantitative information of all relevant cost of both 
sets is available, the agent can quantitively compare A⃗  and B⃗ ’s total cost and choose 
the one with less cost. 
In most real scenarios we don’t have detailed quantitative knowledge of the 
relevant intervention cost above. So epidemically what is more relevant to the concept 
of actual causation is the question of cost minimization on the qualitative level. 
I propose that the question of  qualitatively minimize intervention cost is closely 
linked to the concept of actual causality. I suggest that for a goal event Y = y, if an 
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event set X⃗  =  x⃗  ensures Y=y with qualitative minimal cost in the four aspect above, 
then X⃗  =  x⃗  is a actual cause set for Y=y, and any conjunct X=x of X⃗  =  x⃗  is an actual 
cause of Y=y. Speaking of counterfactual scenarios, event set X⃗  =  x⃗  is actual cause 
set of event Y = y in scenario S if and only if, in all scenarios similar to S in structure, 
X⃗  =  x⃗  ensures event E = e and the cost of the intervention with X⃗  =  x⃗  is 
qualitatively minimal in the four aspect mentioned above.  
In the following chapters, I will further elaborate this idea. In Chapter 2, I 
introduce formalization in causality modeling and define what is a scenarios similar to 
the actual scenario S.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss the Mackie4 intuition that if event X = x causes Y = y, then 
X=x should be a member of a nonredundant sufficient condition set of Y. I will show 
that this nonredundant sufficiency requirement is related to the minimization of 
exploitative cost. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the intuition that if event X = x causes Y = y, then there 
should be some specific causal chain between X=x and Y=y. I will show that this 
chain requirement is related to the minimization of exploratory cost. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss the intuitive distinction between an event’s key cause and 
its background conditions, i.e., the intuition behind causal selection which render 
causation somehow inegalitarian. I will show that this intuition is related to the 
minimization of risk cost. 
                                                            
4 Mackie, J.L.[1965]:'Causes and conditions’, American Philosophy Quarterly 2/4, 261-264. Reprinted 
in E.Sosa and M. Tooley(Eds.), Causation, Oxford University Press, 1993.  
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In Chapter 6, I propose an definition of actual causation which combines the 
analysis of its previous chapters. I will apply this definition, Halpern and Hitchcock 
(2015) definition and Weslake (2015) definition to 66 causal cases, and show that my 
definition fit intuition in more cases than others. 
 
2  Causal Modelling 
Following Pearl and Halpern’s 2005 paper5, I adopt causal modeling approach and 
define some concepts formally in this chapter.  
I limit the discussion in deterministic scenarios and don’t consider genuine 
randomness/ quantum randomness.  I first define a Universal Causal Model that 
models the entire world where the actual causal scenario is embedded in. 
Definition 2.1, Universal Causal Model.  A universal causal model  M𝑤 is a pair  
((Vw ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ， Rw)， Fw). Here,  Vw ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  is the set of all event variables mutually logically 
independent in the actual world. Rw is a function that determines the range of values 
for the variables in Vw ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  , which associates each variable X in Vw ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ with a range of 
values Rw (X). Fw is a function that assigns structural equations to variables, which 
maps each variable X in Vw ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  to an function fwx(PAx
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗) ; PAx⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗  is the markovian parents 
set 6 of X and PAx⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗  ⊆ Vw ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ -{X}; function fwx maps each value setting pax⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   of  PAx
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗  to 
a value x ∈Rw(X). 
                                                            
5 Halpern, J. Y. and Pearl, J. [2005]: ‘Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part I: 
Causes’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 56, pp. 843–87. 
6 According to Pearl, J. [2000]: Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, NY: Cambridge 
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The Universal Causal Model contains the structural relationships between all the 
event variables in a world. We can extract a simplified model M from Mw , which 
only preserves the events relevant to a particular effect event E=e. Hence we can 
define a Simplified Model concerning E=e. 
Definition 2.2, Simplified Model. A simplified model M = ((V⃗ , U⃗ , T⃗ , R), F) for 
event E = e is a pair in which,  (1) V ⃗⃗  ⃗  ⊆ Vw ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗   is the set of endogenous variables, (2) 
U⃗ ⊆  Vw⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ − V ⃗⃗  ⃗ is the set of exogenous variables whose value is independent from V ⃗⃗  ⃗ ’s 
value. (3) T⃗  is the set of dependant variables whose value depent on value of some 
variable in V ⃗⃗  ⃗ but are not considered endogenous by the modeler.(4) R is a function 
that determines the range of values for the variables in V ⃗⃗  ⃗ , which maps each variable 
X in V ⃗⃗  ⃗to a range of values Rw (X).(0) F is a function that assigns structural equations 
to variables, which maps each variable X in V ⃗⃗  ⃗ to an function fwx(PAx
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗) ;  (6)  function 
fwx maps each value setting pax⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   of  PAx
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗  to a value x ∈R(X), as it does in the 
universal causal model. 
A scenario concerning event E=e is a pair (?⃗? ,M), where M is a simplified model 
for E=e, and ?⃗?  is a value setting for the exogenous variables U⃗  in M. 
I completely follow Halpern&Hitchcock’s work in signifying intervention and 
formula’s truth value in a model: 
Intervention with variables in a causal model: “Setting the value of some variable 
X to x in a causal model M=(S,F) by means of an intervention results in a new causal 
                                                            
University Press. P.14,  “let V = {X], . . . , Xn } be an ordered set of variables, and let P(v) be the joint 
probability distribution on these variables. A set of variables PA j is said to be Markovian parents of Xj 
if PAj is a minimal set of predecessors of Xj that renders Xj independent of all its other predecessors.” 
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model denoted MX⃗ =x⃗  . MX⃗ =x⃗  is identical to M, except that the equation for X in F is 
replaced by X=x.”7 
Causal formula’s truth value in a causal model: “A causal formula φ is true or false 
in a causal model, given a context. We write (u⃗ , M)╞ φ if the causal formula ’ is true 
in causal model M given context u⃗ . The ╞ relation is defined inductively. 
(u⃗ , M)╞ X = x if the variable X has value x in the unique solution to the equations in 
M in context u⃗  (that is, the unique vector of values for the endogenous variables that 
simultaneously satisfies all equations in M with the variables in U⃗  set to u⃗ ). The truth 
of conjunctions and negations is defined in the standard way. Finally, (u⃗ , M) ╞[Y =
y]φ  if  (u⃗ , MX⃗ =x⃗ ) ╞φ. ”
8 
Furthermore, we can partition the endogenous variable set V⃗  into the initial 
variable set Vini⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    and the non-initial variable set Vinter⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   :  For any variable X,  X is an 
initial variable iff the arguments set  of the structural function fwx of X has no 
intersection with V⃗ ∪T⃗ . In other words, X is an initial variable iff X’s value doesn’t 
depend directly or indirectly on other variable’s value in V⃗ . 
Only when the value setting of U⃗   is within a certain range can it ensure that the 
condition (3) of the simplified model definition is satisfied and that the simplified 
                                                            
7 Halpern, J. Y. and Christopher Hitchcock. [2015]: ‘Graded Causation and Defaults’, British Journal 
for Philosophy of Science, 66, p.419. 
8 Ibid., p.422. 
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model M is locally deterministic. 9 We can call this specific range of value settings  of 
U⃗  its deterministic range. 
Definition 2.3, Deterministic Range of  U⃗  .  For any subset A⃗  of Vw ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  , its value 
setting range is Range(A⃗ ) = ×
V∈A⃗⃗  
  Rw(V). A subset Ranged(U⃗ )  of Range(U⃗ ) is a 
deterministic range concerning (?⃗? ,M), iff for  any x ∈ Range(Vinter⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ∪T⃗ ), any 𝑢1⃗⃗⃗⃗  ∈ 
Range’(U⃗ )， any 𝑣  ∈ Range(V⃗  ), and any 𝑡 ∈ Range(?⃗?  ), fwx(𝑢1⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑣 ⃗⃗⃗  , 𝑡 ⃗ ) =
 fwx(?⃗? , 𝑣 ⃗⃗⃗  , 𝑡 ⃗ ). 
In other words, whenever 𝑢1 ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗∈ Range’(U⃗ ), the values of all non-initial endogenous 
variables and dependent variables are only influenced by other endogenous variables 
and dependent variables, but not influenced by U⃗ ‘s value change inside Range’(U⃗ ). 
Because this deterministic feature, We can fix these non-initial variable and 
dependent variable’s  structural function’s exogenous arguments into some constant 
value, so that these structure functions don’t contain exogenous variables any more. 
With the concept of Deterministic Range, we can define two different criteria for 
"what is a causal scenario similar to scenario S ": 
Definition 2.4, Reliable Similar Scenario Set. For scenario S= (?⃗? ,M), set {(𝑢′⃗⃗  ⃗,M) 
|𝑢′⃗⃗  ⃗ ∈ Ranged(U⃗ )  } is a reliable similar scenario set to S. 
Definition 2.5. General Similar Scenario Set. For scenario S= (?⃗? ,M),  scenario 
S’=(𝑢′⃗⃗  ⃗, M’) is a general similar scenario to S, iff  U⃗ = U⃗ ′, V⃗ = V′⃗⃗  ⃗, T⃗ = T′⃗⃗  ⃗. All such 
scenarios constitute a general similar scenario set of S. 
                                                            
9 See Halpern, J. Y. and Pearl, J. [2005]: ‘Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part 
I: Causes’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 56, p.848.  
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The two criterions for scenario similarity correspond to our two understanding of 
scenario similarity: 
In Reliable Similar Scenarios of the actual scenario,  the value setting of 
exogenous variables is sufficient to ensure that each endogenous variable acts 
according to its structural equation.  We can regard the whole causal structure as a 
reliable machine which can process input and produce output regularly. For instance, 
suppose an agent is to use a new reliable typewriter to print the word "hello" on a 
piece of paper. The agent only needs to hit  characters “hello” on the keyboard 
without worrying about the internal process of the typewriter, because he/she has 
good reason to assume the typewriter’s internal process will work precisely according 
to its structural functions which are designed for typing-printing. 
In General Similar Scenarios of the actual scenario, the value setting of exogenous 
variables is insufficient to ensure that each endogenous variable acts according to its 
structural equation. If the agent only know that a given scenario is generally similar to 
the actual scenario, but has no further knowledge to assure that the scenario is reliable 
similar to the actual scenario, then the agent needs to intervene with some endogenous 
variables to ensure that the variable follows their structural equation. We can regard 
the whole causal structure in the scenario as an worn-out machine whose internal 
parts do not necessarily follow the prescribed rules.  In order to obtain desirable 
outcome with this machine, the agent needs not only to give correct input on the 
input-interface, but also to intervene with the internal parts to ensure they work 
appropriately. For instance, suppose the actor is to use a worn-out typewriter to print 
the word "hello" . He/she has to both hit “hello” on the keyboard and take some 
maintenance operations to ensure the typewriter work well.  
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3  Exploitative Cost and Sufficiency Requirement of 
Causation 
 
With the causal modelling support of Chapter 2, we can investigate actual 
causation and start with the simplest kind of causal scenario. 
Definition 3.1, Direct Connection Model. A simplified model M is a direct 
connection model of event E=e, iff M’s endogenous variable set consists only of some 
event E=e and its structural function’s argument set VE⃗⃗⃗⃗ = {X1， …， Xn} such that:  
(1) E= fE(U⃗ ，X1，…Xn); (2) for any Xi in VE⃗⃗⃗⃗ , Xi = fxi(U⃗ ). In other words, in this 
model, all endogenous variables other than E are directly linked to E through the 
structural function of E, and they are only affected by exogenous variables. 
For instance, Jack’s flowers in the backyard survive iff  Jack waters the flowers 
and there is no hail. I.e., Flower = Water & ~ Hail. Here, the three variables Water, 
Hail and Flower and the relationship between them constitute a direct connection 
model. 
Suppose (u⃗  ， M) is an actual direct connection scenario and  (u⃗  ， M) ╞ E=e. 
When the agent faces a similar situation  (u′⃗⃗⃗   ， M), if the actor is to ensure the event 
E = e and to minimize cost , then it would be reasonable to take the following 
intervention strategy:  Only intervene with a subset S⃗ = s  of E’s structural function’s 
arguments set, and S⃗   should satisfies two conditons: (1) intervention with S⃗ = s  
ensures E=e, no matter how other variable’s value changes.(2) Any subset of S does 
not satisfy condition (1). 
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The condition (1) above ensures that the strategy is efficient in producing E=e, and 
the condition(2) ensures that the strategy is nonredundant. Based on this strategy, we 
can define direct cause of a event. 
Definition 3.2  Direct Cause Preliminary. In scenario (u⃗ , M), event C = c is direct 
cause  of event E = e, iff  C = c belongs to a set  S⃗  = s   and S⃗  = s  satisfies: (1) (u⃗  ， 
M)╞ （S⃗  = s  & E=e）;(2)let W⃗⃗⃗  = ?⃗? -𝑆 -{E},then for any ?⃗⃗⃗? = ?⃗⃗? '， (u⃗  ,M)╞  [?⃗⃗⃗? = ?⃗⃗? '] 
E=e; (3) no subset of S⃗  = s  satisfies both (1)and (2). We can call the set S⃗  = s  which 
satisfies (1)(2)(3) a direct cause set of E=e. 
In scenarios more complex than direct connection scenarios, some events are 
indirectly connected to the effect event. Then, the question of how to determine a 
reasonable intervention strategy will depend on which kind of similar scenarios are 
relevant to the actual scenario and worth consideration. Following this distinction of 
the two criteria for scenario similarity, we can distinguish two kind of intervention 
strategy: 
(1) Intervention  in unreliable similar scenarios to the actual scenario. In this type 
of scenarios, the value setting of the exogenous variable is insufficient to ensure that 
each endogenous variable follows its structured equation. The agent needs to 
intervene with some endogenous variables to ensure these variables follow their 
structural equation. 
This leads to the idea that there are two kind of intervention with an individual 
variable: value intervention and function intervention. In value intervention, the agent 
fixes the value of event variable X to X = x by intervention. In function intervention, 
the actor ensures that X’s value assignment follows its structural function fx. For 
instance, in the worn-out typewriter case above, the agent should do both value 
intervention (e.g., typing on keyboard) and function intervention (e.g., do some 
13 
 
internal maintenance to make the typewriter work well) to ensure his/her desired 
outcome. 
We can use 𝑆v⃗⃗  ⃗ to denote the set of events that the agent does value intervention 
with, use 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ to denote the set of events the agent does function intervention with,  and 
use Lossv (X = x) and Lossf (X = x) to denote the cost of  value intervention and 
function intervention for event X = x. Then we can formulate the equation for an 
exploitative intervention strategy’s total intervention costs: 
 Lossintervention =  ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑣(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖)𝑋𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑆_𝑣⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    +  ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑓(𝑋𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗)𝑋𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑆_𝑓⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   
 If the agent wants to both ensure E=e and to minimize the intervention cost, 
adopting the intervention strategy below will be reasonable: 
Intervention Strategy in Unreliable Scenario: Do value intervention to some 
𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and do function intervention to some 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ , while 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ should 
satisfy: (1) 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ are subsets of the endogenous variables and mutually disjoint; 
(2) value intervention with 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and function intervention with 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ ensures E=e, no 
matter how other endogenous variables’ value changes. (3) for any subset 𝑆𝑣′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    
of 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and subset  𝑆𝑓′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗  of 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ , the pair (𝑆𝑣′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    , 𝑆𝑓′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗) doesnot satisfy  (1) and (2). 
The condition (1) of the strategy avoids inconsistent interventions; the condition 
(2) and (3) ensures that the strategy is both efficient and nonredundant in producing 
the effect event E=e. Based on this strategy, I propose the Sufficiency Requirement in 
Unreliable Scenario for actual causation: 
Proposition 3.3, Sufficiency Requirement in Unreliable Scenario for actual 
causation. In an case where unreliable scenarios similar to (?⃗? ,M) are relevant, if event 
C = c is actual cause of E = e, then the scenario should satisfies:  (1) exist 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠v⃗⃗  ⃗ and 
𝑆f⃗⃗⃗    such that for endogenous variable set’s actual value setting V⃗ = v⃗  ,  𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠v⃗⃗  ⃗  ⊆ V⃗ =
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v⃗ ，𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗  ⊆ ?⃗? , and 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ ∩𝑆f⃗⃗⃗   = {},  X=x ∈𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠v⃗⃗  ⃗; (2)  let ?⃗⃗⃗?  =?⃗? - 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗- 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ -{E}, for any ?⃗⃗⃗? = 
?⃗⃗? ′, (u⃗  ,M)╞ [𝑆v⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ , ?⃗⃗⃗? = ?⃗⃗? ′] E=e ;(3) for any subset 𝑆𝑣′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗  of 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and subset  𝑆𝑓′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗  of 
𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ , the pair (𝑆𝑣′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗  , 𝑆𝑓′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗) doesnot satisfy  (1) and (2). 
We can call a set  𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠v⃗⃗  ⃗  which satisfies (1) and (2) in proposition 3.3 an 
sufficient set for E = e in unreliable scenarios similar to (u⃗ , M). 
(2) Intervention in reliable scenarios. In this type of scenarios, the value setting of 
the exogenous variable is sufficient to ensure that each endogenous variable follows 
its structural function.  
In cases where this type of scenarios is relevant,  a reasonable intervention strategy 
for the agent is:  Do value intervention to some 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and do function intervention 
to some 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ , while 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ should satisfy: (1) 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ are subsets of the 
endogenous variables and mutually disjoint; (2) value intervention with 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ , 
function intervention with 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ and the following-structural-function nature of noninitial 
variables ensures E=e, no matter how other endogenous variables’ value changes. (3) 
for any subset 𝑆𝑣′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    of 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and subset  𝑆𝑓′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗  of 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ , the pair (𝑆𝑣′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    , 𝑆𝑓′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗) 
doesnot satisfy  (1) and (2). 
Based on this strategy, I propose the Sufficiency Requirement In Reliable Scenario 
for actual cause: 
Proposition 3.4, Sufficiency Requirement In Reliable Scenario for actual cause. In 
an case where unreliable scenarios similar to (?⃗? ,M) are relevant, if event C = c is 
actual cause of E = e, then the scenario should satisfies:  (1) exist 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠v⃗⃗  ⃗ and 𝑆f⃗⃗⃗    such 
that for endogenous variable set’s actual value setting V⃗ = v⃗  ,  𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠v⃗⃗  ⃗  ⊆ V⃗ = v⃗ ，
𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗  ⊆ ?⃗? , and 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ ∩𝑆f⃗⃗⃗   = {},  X=x ∈𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠v⃗⃗  ⃗; (2)  let ?⃗⃗⃗?  =𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑖⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ - 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗- 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ , for any ?⃗⃗⃗? = ?⃗⃗? ′, 
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(u⃗  ,M)╞ [𝑆v⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ , ?⃗⃗⃗? = ?⃗⃗? ′] E=e ;(3) for any subset 𝑆𝑣′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗  of 𝑆𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗  and subset  𝑆𝑓′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗  of 𝑆𝑓⃗⃗  ⃗ , 
the pair (𝑆𝑣′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗  , 𝑆𝑓′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗) doesnot satisfy  (1) and (2). 
We can call a set S⃗  = 𝑠   which satisfies (1) and (2) in proposition 3.4 an sufficient 
set for E = e in reliable scenarios similar to (u⃗ , M).  
 
4   Exploratory Cost and Continuity Requirement of 
Causation 
In this chapter I discuss the chain feature of actual causation and show that this 
chain feature helps minimize exploratory cost.  
I mentioned in the introduction that sometimes the goal we seek is exploratory, i.e., 
the goal is to explore the world and extend causal knowledge. A straight way to carry 
out this exploration is to actually or virtually test different sets of events to see 
whether intervention with these event set can ensure the effect event no matter how 
other events’ value settings change. However, these actual or virtual tests have cost, 
such as the exploitative cost of intervention in each trial and the risk cost that some 
undesired events occur. 
The following three reasoning operation (extrapolation operation, interpolation 
operation and flank operation) remarkably reduce the number and cost of tests that the 
agent need to try for exploration. To understand the three principles, I first define the 
concept of cause net: 
Definition 4.1 Cause Net. For a scenario (u⃗ , M) concerning event E=e: 
(1) any direct cause set N⃗⃗ = n⃗  of E=e is a cause net of E=e. 
(2) for any cause net N‘ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  = n ’⃗⃗⃗⃗  of E=e, replace some member X=x of  N‘ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  = n ’⃗⃗⃗⃗  with 
one of  X=x’s direct cause set, the new set is also a cause net of E=e. 
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It can be proved that if N⃗⃗ = n⃗  is a cause net of E=e in (u⃗ , M), then  N⃗⃗ = n⃗   is a 
sufficient set for E=e in reliable scenarios of (u⃗ , M). In other words, if all noninitial 
event variables follow their structural functions, intervention with N⃗⃗ = n⃗   can ensure 
E=e no matter how other initial variables change. With the concept of cause net , I 
now introduce the three reasoning operations: 
Interpolation Operation. Suppose S⃗ = s   is a cause net of E = e in scenario 
(u⃗ , M) . Replace some member X=x of S⃗ = s   with a set H⃗⃗ = h⃗ , and H⃗⃗ = h⃗  should 
satisfy:  for each direct cause chain {X=x, …, E=e} where each chain member is a 
direct cause of its successor, the successor of X=x is included in H⃗⃗ = h⃗ . This 
operation is a interpolation operation on (S⃗ = s , 𝑋 = 𝑥). It can be proved that the new 
set S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗  after replacement is an sufficient set in reliable scenarios of (u⃗ , M). 
Extrapolation Operation: Suppose S⃗ = s   is a cause net of E = e in scenario 
(u⃗ , M) . Replace some member X=x of S⃗ = s   with a one of X=x’s sufficient set I = i . 
This operation is a Extrapolation Operation on (S⃗ = s , 𝑋 = 𝑥). It can be proved that 
the new set S′′⃗⃗⃗⃗ = s′′⃗⃗  ⃗ after replacement  is an sufficient set in reliable scenarios of 
(u⃗ , M). 
Flank Operation: Suppose S⃗ = s   is a cause net of E = e in scenario (u⃗ , M) . Do a 
interpolation operation on (S⃗ = s , 𝑋 = 𝑥) and get a new set S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗ , then do a 
extrapolation operation on (S‘ ⃗⃗  ⃗ = s ’⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝑍 = 𝑧) for each Z∈S′⃗⃗ − S⃗  . These serial of 
operations constitute a Flank Operation. the new set S′′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ = s′′′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ after operation is an 
sufficient intervention set in reliable scenarios of (u⃗ , M). 
We can call the average length of all direct causal chains from S⃗ = s  members to E 
= e as the distance from S⃗ = s   to E = e. If S⃗ = s   is a cause net of E=e, then a 
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sufficient set less distanced from E=e than S⃗ = s   can be acquired by interpolation 
operation, a sufficient set more distanced from E=e than S⃗ = s   can be acquired by 
extrapolation operation, and  a sufficient set as distanced from E=e as S⃗ = s   may be 
acquired by a flank operation. Hence by using the three operations above,  an agent 
can extend his/her causal knowledge without actual or virtual experiment trials.  
There is some special connection between the interpolation operation and chain of 
direct causes. By definition, only events which belong to a direct cause chain toward 
E=e can replace others or be replaced in the interpolation operation. This means only 
events in direct cause chain to E=e can be start point or end point in an interpolation 
operation. 10 
Therefore, the within-direct-chain feature of an event is valuable  for minimizing 
exploration cost. When an agent  is to explore which events are causes of E = e, if 
he/she already knows that X = x is cause of E = e and there is a direct causal chain 
from X=x to E=e, then he/she don’t have to actually or virtually test all the possible 
value settings of relevant variables one by one; the agent can simply start from the 
position X=x and use the three reasoning operations to explore outward, inward and 
sideways.   
In other words, if the agent has three kind of knowledge: (1) already-known actual 
causes (e.g., X=x is cause of E=e) ;(2) local causal knowledge (e.g., X=x is Y=y’s 
direct cause or X=x is Z=z’s direct effect); (3) direct chain knowledge (e.g., {X,Y,E} 
                                                            
10 I guess the connection between interpolation operation and chain feature of causation is a source of  
people’s intuition that a cause in some sense produces a effect:  because in causal exploration people 
can ‘conquer’ from one event X=x to another event Y=y along the chain,  people are inclined to think 
that X=x produces Y=y. 
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or {Z,X,E} is subset of some direct cause chain toward E=e), he/she can calculate 
whether another event (Y=y or Z=z) is E=e’s cause without doing experiments. 
So we have reason to take the chain feature as a requirement for actual causation: 
Weak Continuity Requirement: if X = x is the cause of E = e, there is a a chain 
{X=x, …, E=e} such that each member in the chain is direct cause of its successor. 
In most cases, when we say X=x is cause of E=e, the intuition demands not only 
that X=x belongs to some set S⃗ = s  which ensures E=e’, but also that X=x belongs to 
some sets which ensures that E=e is caused in the way or routine that it is actually 
caused. In other words,  it is demanded that there is at least a direct causal chain from 
X=x to E=e and for each event Z=z in the chain, there is a set Sz = sz which satisfies: 
(1) X=x ∈Sz⃗⃗  ⃗ = sz⃗⃗  ⃗ ; (2) Sz = sz is nonrendundant sufficient set for Z=z. We can 
formulate a more strict requirement based on this intuition: 
Strong Continuity Requirement: if  X = x is cause of E = e, then there is set {X = 
x,..., E = e} which satisfies: (1) each member of the set is direct cause of its successor; 
(2) for any member Z=z in this set,  there is a set Sz⃗⃗  ⃗ = sz⃗⃗  ⃗ , X=x ∈Sz⃗⃗  ⃗ = sz⃗⃗  ⃗, and Sz⃗⃗  ⃗ = sz⃗⃗  ⃗  
is a non-redundant sufficient set for Z=z. 
 
5 Risk Cost and Abnormality Requirement of Causation 
The phenomena of causal selectivity exists beyond the requirements in previous 
chapters.11 We often take some events as key cause of an effect and take other events 
as background conditions. For instance, When a match is lit in the room, we tend to 
                                                            
11 Halpern, J. Y. and Christopher Hitchcock. [2015]: ‘Graded Causation and Defaults’, British Journal 
for Philosophy of Science, 66, p.443. 
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think movement of the match  rather than presence of  oxygen is cause of the fire, 
although in the structural function of the fire, Fire = Match & Oxygen, Match and 
Oxygen’s status is equal. When Jim is eating in the kitchen on the second floor, we 
generally don’t not think the floor’s being firm is a cause of Jim’s survival, although 
strictly speaking, if the floor is not firm and cracks, Jim will fall and die. 
Causal selectivity can be explained by minimization of risk cost. Suppose S⃗ = s  is 
a nonredundant sufficient set for E=e. If the agent desires E=e but fails to intervene 
with S⃗ = s   or part of S⃗ = s  , the agent faces the risk that E=e might not occur, but in 
the mean time, he/she saves the intervention cost for intervening with S⃗ = s  or part of 
it. If the risk cost is significantly lower than the intervention cost, there is good reason 
not to intervene with S⃗ = s  or its parts. 
Quantitively, if we use Lossrisk(S⃗ = s ) to denote cost of the total risk that E=e 
might not occur if intervention with S⃗ = s  is absent,  use Lossmiss (S⃗ = s ) to denote 
the cost of E’s nonoccurrence  in a particular scenario where  S⃗ ≠ s  and E≠e, use  
Smiss to denote the set of scenorios where S⃗ ≠ s  and E≠e, and use P(S) to denote the 
probability of a particular scenario S,  their relationship is as below:             
Formula 5.1, Loss for risk: 
Lossrisk(S⃗ = s  ) =  Lossmiss(S⃗ = s  ) ∗  ∑ P(s)
s∈Smiss
  
Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) proposed a requirement of causal selection for 
actual causation12 and the requirement can be seen as a way to filter the events with 
low risk cost. Briefly speaking, Halpern and Hitchcock's idea is that if  X⃗ = x⃗  is cause 
                                                            
12 Halpern, J. Y. and Christopher Hitchcock. [2015]: ‘Graded Causation and Defaults’, British Journal 
for Philosophy of Science, 66, p.424, 435. 
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of E=e in scenario (u⃗ , M), then there should be some contrastive scenario S'  where: 
(1) X⃗ ≠ x⃗  , (2) there is a set of variables 𝑍  whose members are all on paths from X⃗  to 
E, and all members in 𝑍 − X⃗   follow their structural function;(3) E≠e and (4) S’ is at 
least as normal as the actual scenario S. 
I revised Halpern&Hitchcock’s requirement to make it work well with other 
requirement in previous chapters: 
Definition 5.2  Intrinsic Scenario. If X⃗ = x⃗  is an sufficient set for E=e in scenario 
S=(u⃗ ,M), then：let ?⃗? = ?⃗?  be the set of all X⃗ = x⃗  's member's ancestors. For any 
memer Y in  ?⃗? − 𝑋  , (1) remove Y from the endogenous variable set ?⃗? .(2) for any Z 
in ?⃗?  whose structural function's arguments contain Y, replace Y with its value in S in 
that function's expression. The resulting scenario Si=(u⃗ , Mi) is an intrinsic scenario 
between X⃗ = x⃗  and E=e. 
Definition 5.3. Causal Selection Requirement. If  Sv⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑠𝑣⃗⃗  ⃗ is an actual cause set for 
E=e in (u⃗ , M), then there exist scenario S’ where: (1) X⃗ ≠ x⃗ , (2)  all variables which 
are functionally intervened with follow their structural functions; If in the discussed 
case only reliable scenarios of (u⃗ , M) is relevant, all noninitial variables follow their 
structural function, (3) E≠e; (4) the intrinsic scenario Si' of  S’ is at least as normal as 
the intrinsic scenario Si of S. 
The reason for using Intrinsic Scenario is: (1) since it is not specified how a 
simplified model M’s endogenous variables V⃗  shall be selected, it might be the case 
that V⃗  contains many variables which are not relevant to the way how X⃗  influences  E. 
By creating an intrinsic Scenario, these variables are removed away. (2) the intrinsic 
scenario procedure helps to avoid some counter intuition application of  definition 5.3. 
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According to the requirement above, if  X⃗ = x⃗   meets the requirement, there is at 
least one scenario S ' where intervention with X⃗ = x⃗   is absent and the probability of  
E≠e is no less than the probability of E = e. Thus, at least in scenario S’ it is 
reasonable to intervene with X⃗ = x⃗ .  
In contrast, if  X⃗ = x⃗   failed to meet the requirement, then for any scenario S’ 
which satisfies (u⃗ ,M)|=[ X⃗ ≠ x⃗ , V⃗ − X⃗ − F⃗ = (v⃗ − x⃗ − f  )′] E≠e, either S’ is less 
probable than S so that the actual scenario S is no more an abnormal scenario, or the 
probability of S’ is not comparable with that of S so that the agent is unable to judge 
whether the actual scenario S is an abnormal scenario. 
The next question is , how to compare the probability of two scenarios without 
knowing the specific value of their probability? According to Bayesian network 
theory, for a causal scenario S containing ordered events {X1 = x1, … , Xn = xn}, the 
probability of this scenario 13is: 
P(X1 = x1, … , Xn = xn) =    ∏( P(Xi = xi|PAi = pai))
xi∈s
 
Where PAi = paI is the value setting of Xi's parent event set in S, i.e., the argument 
set of Xi’s structural function. 
When we are to compare the probabilities of two scenarios S = {X1 = x1, … , Xn =
xn}, S '= {X1′ = x1′, … , Xn′ = xn′}, both probabilities can be calculated in the way 
above mentioned: 
Formula 5.4 Probability of Scenario 
                                                            
13 Pearl, J. [2000]: Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. P.14. 
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P(S) =    ∏( P(Xi = xi |PAi = pai))
xi∈s
 
P(S′) =    ∏( P(Xi = xi
′ |PAi = pa′i))
xi∈s′
 
In everyday life, we often do not know the exact value of each 
P(Xi = xi |PAi = pai) in the right side of the formulas. However, usually the ordering 
of P(Xi = xi |PAi = pai) and P(Xi = xi ′|PAi = pa′i) is knowable:
14 
(1) Suppose XI is an initial endogenous variable in the model. If there is some 
value xi0 that for any xi in Xi’s domain, P(xi0) ≥ P(xi), xi0 usually would be seen as 
XI’s default value. Because PAi= {}, it can be implied that for any xi in XI’s domain, 
P(xi0|PAi = {}) >= P(xi|PAi = {}). 
(2) Suppose XI is an non-initial endogenous variable in the model. Let fxi(paxi) be 
XI’s value following its structural function. In reliable scenarios, for any xi in XI’s 
domain and any value setting of XI’s parents set paij, P(fxi(paxij)|pai)  >=
P(xi’|paij). 
 For two similar scenarios S and S ', if for any endogenous variables 
Xi ,P(Xi = xi |PAi = pai) >=  P(Xi = xi’ |PAi = pai’), 
15 then due to Formula 5.3, P 
(S)> = P (S ').  
Using the procedures above, if we know the default value of each initial variable 
and the structural function for each non-initial variable, we can compare any two 
                                                            
14 This account has affinity with Halpern and Hitchcock’s concept of Default Rule 1, the difference is 
that in part (1) of my account,  exogenous parents are accommodated. See Halpern, J. Y. and 
Hitchcock, C. [2013]: ‘Compact representations of causal models’, Cognitive Science, 37, p. 1004. 
15 Here I add apostrophe sign to variable value to mean it is a value setting in S’. 
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scenarios S and S’, and decide whether P (S) ≥  P (S′),  P (S) <P (S '), or they are 
incomparable. 
 
6  An Actual Causation Definition and Comparison with 
Other Definitions 
I present a definition of actual causation by incorporating requirements of actual 
causation in previous chapters. 
Definition 6.1, Direct cause 
X = x is direct cause of Y = y, iff in the scenario S= (u⃗ , ((PAy⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ ∪{Y}, R), F)), X=x 
satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) Sufficiency: X = x ∈ S⃗ = s  ; let W⃗⃗⃗  =  V⃗ − S⃗ − {Y}, for any W⃗⃗⃗ = w⃗⃗⃗ ’, 
(u⃗ , M) ╞ [S⃗ = s , W⃗⃗⃗ = w⃗⃗⃗ ’] Y = y 
(2) Non-redundancy: any subset S′⃗⃗ = s   of  S⃗ = s   doesn’t satisfies (1) 
(3) Abnormality:  there is some scenario  S’ where (u⃗ , M) ╞ [S⃗ = s′⃗⃗ ≠ s , W⃗⃗⃗ =
w′⃗⃗⃗⃗ ’] Y ≠ y , and the probability of S’ is not less than that of S. 
Definition 6.2, Actual Cause 
Event C = c is actual cause of E = e in scenario S= (u⃗ , M) iff  C=c and E=e 
satisfies the following conditions: 
(1)Sufficiency: there exist three set IS⃗⃗  ⃗,  KS⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ , W⃗⃗⃗ , which satisfy: 
(a)  IS⃗⃗  ⃗  ⊆ ?⃗? ,  KS⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ ⊆ ?⃗? ,   W⃗⃗⃗ = V⃗ − IS⃗⃗  ⃗ − KS⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ , for some subset W’ of W and for any 
value setting w’ of W’: (u⃗ ,  M)╞ [IS⃗⃗  ⃗ = is⃗⃗ ,  W′⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ = w’⃗⃗⃗⃗ ] E = e 
(b) If in the case only reliable scenarios of S is relevant,  KS⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗  is  the set of all 
noninitial endogenous variables. If not,  KS⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗  ={}. 
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(2)Non-redundancy: For any IS′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  = is′⃗⃗ ⊆  IS⃗⃗  ⃗ = is⃗⃗ ,  FS⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗′ ⊆  FS⃗⃗⃗⃗ ,  (IS′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  = is′⃗⃗ ,  FS⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗′) 
doesn’t satisfies (1). 
 (3) Abnormalities: there exist a scenario S’  where (u⃗ , M)╞ [IS⃗⃗  ⃗ = is′⃗⃗⃗⃗ ≠ is⃗⃗ , W⃗⃗⃗ =
w ’‘ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗] E ≠ e  and the probability of  the intrinsic scenario Si’ of S’ is no less than the 
probability of that of S. 
(4) Continuity: there exist a ordered set of {C = c,..., E = e} which satisfies: 
(a)  each member in the set is direct cause of its successor. 
(b) for any member Z=z in the set beside C,  C=c and Z=z  satisfies 
(1),(2),(3) . 
If intentional action is involved in a causal scenario, the case become a bit 
complicated. If we use apply Definition 6.2 to intentional action-involving cases, 
counter-intuitional judgement may appear. For instance: 
Example 6.3，Weslake’s Careful Poisoning. “Assistant Bodyguard puts a 
harmless antidote in Victim’s coffee (A = 1). Buddy then poisons the coffee (B = 1), 
using a poison that is normally lethal, but which is countered by the antidote. Buddy 
would not have poisoned the coffee if Assistant had not administered the antidote 
first. Victim drinks the coffee and survives (D = 0).”16 Definition 6.2 judges that 
Buddy’s poisoning (B=1) is cause of the victim’s not  being killed (D=0), yet it is  
counterintuitional that a counteracted poisoning of the victim is cause of survival of 
that victim. 
Example 6.4，Dual Switch Lamp.  A lamp is connected with Switch A and 
Switch B. The lamp is turned on iff one switch is on and the other is off. Jim turns 
                                                            
16 Weslake, B. (2015). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal Philosophy of 
Science.p22. 
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Switch A on (J=1). Karl would turns Switch B on only when Switch A is off.(K=0) 
Thus, the lamp is turned on. (L=1) 17 Definition 6.2 judges  that Karl’s not turning 
Switch B on is a cause of the lamp’s being on, which is counter intuitional. 
We can add a further requirement for intentional action to deal with these 
problems. 
Requirement 6.5  Requirement for Intentional Action. 
(1) Every intentional action  B is composed of some intention event I=I and some 
following motion event A=a，and I is A’s parent variable in the relevant model. 
(2) B={I=i, A=a} is cause of event E=e,  iff both I=i and A=a are causes of E=e. 
With this requirement,  in Example 6.3 Assistant and Buddy’s intentions should be 
added to the model as variables. Thus ,the scenario’s structural function set becomes 
{AI=1;BI=1;A=AI;B=BI&A; E=~A&B}. Neither Assistant’s intentional action 
{AI=1;A=1} or Buddy’s intentional action {BI=1; B=1} meet the Intentional Action 
Requirement. This result is consistent with the intuition that neither Assistant nor 
Buddy’s action is cause of the victim’s survival. Similarly, in Example 6.4 Jim and 
Karl’s intentions should be added to the model as variables, and the scenario’s 
structural function set becomes {JI=1;KI=1; J=JI;K=KI&~J; E=(A&~B)|(~A&B)}. 
Only Jim’s intentional action {JI=1, J=1} meet the Intentional Action Requirement, 
and this result is consistent with the intuition that Jim’s action rather than Karl’s 
causes the lamp’s being on. Other causal cases with intentional actions can also be 
dealt in this way. 
                                                            
17 See Giordani,A. (2016). An Internal Limit of the Structural Analysis of Causation, Axiomathes, 26: p444, 
“world1”. 
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I collect 66 different causal cases from actual causation literature. I compare the 
intuition of causation in these cases with applications of three recent definition of 
actual causation using causal modelling approach: (1) Definition 6.2 with the 
intentional action requirement; (2) Halpern and Hitchcock’s definition for graded 
causes 18; (3) Weslake’s partial theory definition for actual causation19. The complete 
result of comparison is in Appendix II. A summary of the comparison is as below: 
Table 6.6 Comparison of Definition Applications 
counterintuition 
cases count 
total cases 
count 
Halpern&Hitchcock 9 or 1820 66 
Weslake 27 66 
Liang 0 66 
Specifically, Comparing definition 6.2 with Halpern and Hitchcock’s definition, 
there are three types of cases that worth mentioning. 
18 Halpern, J. Y. and Christopher Hitchcock. [2015]: ‘Graded Causation and Defaults’, British Journal 
for Philosophy of Science, 66, p.424, 435. 
19 Weslake, B. [2015]: ‘A partial theory of actual causation’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 
Forthcoming. p.23. 
20 If we consider cause by omission as cause intuitively, then the count of counterintuition cases for
Halpern&Hitchcock definition is 18. If we don’t consider cause by omission as genuine cause, the 
count is 9.  
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(1) Non-binary domains. When the event variable’s domain size is more than 2, 
sometimes HPH definition would yield counterintuitive judgement. Definition 6.2 
doesn’t. 
(2) Variables carrying multiple properties. When one event variable has 2 or more 
causally relevant property(such as intensity and color), sometimes HPH definition 
yields counterintuitive judgements. Definition 6.2 doesn’t. 
(3) Cause by omissions. It is claimed that the Halpern and Hitchcock definition can 
explain why some think omission is not genuine cause while some others think 
omission is21. Due to Halpern&Hitchcock’s theory, this is because “those who 
maintain that omissions are never causes can be understood as  having a normality 
ranking where absences or omissions are more typical than positive events”22, while 
some others don’t endorse such a normality ranking. 
In  applications of Definition 6.2, many omissions refuted by Halpern&Hitchcock 
definition are seen as cause. Then a question is , does my theory have the potential to 
explain why people have intuitive disagreement concerning cause by omission? 
From the view point of  cost minimization, the disagreement above reflect such a 
question: when we are to consider whether to cancel intervening with some events to 
minimize intervention cost,  should the object of the canceled intervention  be an 
entire sufficient set or some single event in a sufficient set ? 
In definition 6.2, the object of the canceled intervention is a sufficient set, i.e.,  we 
only consider whether cancelling intervention of such a set is desirable for cost 
                                                            
21 Halpern, J. Y. and Christopher Hitchcock. [2015]: ‘Graded Causation and Defaults’, British Journal 
for Philosophy of Science, 66, p.437. 
22 Ibid., p.437. 
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minimization. If we make some revision to definition 6.2 and change the object of 
canceled intervention to some single event, the Abnormality Condition of definition 
6.2 becomes: 
 (3’) Abnormalities: there exist a scenario S’  where (u⃗ , M)╞ [C = c′ ≠ c, W⃗⃗⃗ =
w ’‘ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗] E ≠ e  and the probability of  the intrinsic scenario  Si’ of S’ is no less than the 
probability of that of S. 
In the alternative of Definition 6.2 by replacing (3) with (3’),  generally omissions 
will no longer be considered cause. Therefore, my actual causation theory can also 
explain people’s intuitive disagreement in cause by omission. But according to my 
theory, the essence of the disagreement is disagreement in how to think of the object 
of canceled intervention, i.e., disagreement in whether the proper object should be a 
sufficient set of the effect event or a single event in such a set.  
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Appendix I: Proof of Interpolation Operation Principle 
Proposition: Suppose S⃗ = s   is a cause net of E = e in a reliable scenario (u⃗ , M) . 
Replace some member X=x of S⃗ = s   with a set H⃗⃗ = h⃗ , and H⃗⃗ = h⃗  should satisfy:  for 
each direct cause chain {X=x, …, E=e} where each chain member is a direct cause of 
its successor, the successor of X=x is included in H⃗⃗ = h⃗ . The new set after 
replacement S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗  is an sufficient set in reliable scenarios. 
Proof: 
1, Partition Sdir⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ = sdir⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   into  S1⃗⃗  ⃗ = s1⃗⃗  ⃗ ⊆ S⃗ = s   and  S2⃗⃗  ⃗ = s2⃗⃗  ⃗ ⊆ Sex⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ − S⃗ = 𝑠𝑒𝑥⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ − 𝑠  .Let 
the expression ‘A ensure B’ be short for A is a sufficient set for B. 
2, if X=x is direct cause of E=e, then E = e will be added  into S1⃗⃗  ⃗ = s1⃗⃗  ⃗, and {E = e} 
ensure its own occurrence. 
3, if X=x is not direct cause of E=e, then: 
3.1, , S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗   ensures S1⃗⃗  ⃗ = s1⃗⃗  ⃗ . Because, since X = x is not member of  Sdir⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ = sdir⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   , 
the relation  S1⃗⃗  ⃗ = s1⃗⃗  ⃗ ⊆ S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗  would still hold after deleting X=x from S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗ .  
3.2, S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗  ensures  Sex⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ − S⃗ = 𝑠𝑒𝑥⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ − 𝑠 , hence  S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗  ensures S2⃗⃗  ⃗ = s2⃗⃗  ⃗. This is 
because,for any variable Z=z in Sex⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ − S⃗ , either X=x is an ancestor in some direc cause 
chain to Z=z or not, S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗   ensures Z=z : 
3.2.1, if X=x is an ancestor in some direct cause chains to Z=z, then for any of these 
chains, during the interpolate operation either Z or some variable between X=x and 
Z=z in the chain is added into S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗ , and it can be recursively proved that S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗  
ensures Z=z. 
3.2.2, if X=x is not an ancestor in some direct cause chain to Z=z, then the value of Z 
won’t be influenced by X=x’s being removed. 
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4 Combining 2 and 3, S′⃗⃗ = s′⃗⃗  ensures  E = e. 
  
                                            Appendix II Comparison OF Definition Application By Cases 
In the Table below I collect 66 causal scenarios from different souces and compare three definitions’ application to these scenarios. 
The Formulas column shows the structural functions of each scenario, where e means the effect event. If a non-effect variable Y’s domain size is larger than 
2,  I explicitly show its domans in the formula in forms like “${'y':{0,1,2}}”. If an event variable X carries two properties A and B(such as intensity and 
color), I use one integar x= (Property_B_Domain_Size * Property_A_Value + Property_B_Value) to denote the value of X. 
The Intuition column shows what our main intuition judges as causes of the effect e. The Liang, HPH, Weslake column shows what each author’s definition 
judges as causes of e.1 If the content in a Liang, HPH or Weslake unit matchs intuition, the unit is left blank.   
The Source column shows the source of citation of each scenaro: 
P stands for scenarios in  Paul,L.A.and N.Hall(2013).Causation:A User's Guide.Oxford,U.K.:Oxford University Press. The following number means original 
figure number. 
G stands for scenarios in Giordani,A. (2016). An Internal Limit of the Structural Analysis of Causation, Axiomathes, 26: pp429-450. The following number 
means page number. 
W stands for scenarios in Weslak,B. (2015). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. To Appear. The following 
number means original example number. 
 
 Liang HPH Weslake Intuition Formulas Source 
1   d c,d a=1;c=1;d=c;b=~c&a;e=d|b 
P1 
2    a,b a=1;c=0;d=c;b=~c&a;e=d|b 
P2 
3  c*
2  a,c a=0;c=1;e = ~a & c  
P3 
4    c,d c=1;d = c;b = c;e=d 
P8 
5    f,c f=1;d=1;c=f;e= c;a=d;b=a 
P9 
                                                            
1 Liang Definition is Definition 6.2 of this paper. HPH Definition is the definition from Halpern, J. Y. and Christopher Hitchcock. [2015]: ‘Graded Causation and Defaults’, 
British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 66, p.424, p.435. Weslake Definition is from Weslak,B. (2015). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science,p23. 
2 I use asterisk to mark the counterintuitive scenarios which would be intuitive if all causes by omissions are not considered as genuine cause. 
6  a*  a,d,f a=1;c=1;b = c;d= c;f =  ~d & b;e = ~f &a 
P10 
7    c,a c=1;a=1;e=c|a 
P11 
8   d c,d a=1;c=1;f=1;b= ~c &a;g = ~c &f;d = c;e = b | g | d 
P12a 
9    a,b,f,g a=1;c=0;f=1;b= ~c &a;g = ~c &f;d = c;e = b | g | d 
P12b 
10    D a=1;c=1;f=1;b= ~c &a;g = ~c &f;d = 1;e = b | g | d 
P13a 
11  a,d,b,g,f* a,b,f a,c,f,b,d,g a=1;c=0;f=1;b= ~c &a;g = ~c &f;d = 1;e = b | g | d 
P13b 
12  a,b  a,b,c,f a=1;c=1;b=a;f=c;d=a&~c;e=(b&d)|(d&f)|(b&f) 
P14a 
13    c c=1;e=c 
P20 
14  c*  c,f c=1;f=0;d=0; b=c&f; e = d|(c&~f) 
P21a 
15    d c=1;f=1;d=1; b=c&f; e = d|(c&~f) 
P21b 
16    c c=1;d=1;e=~c&d 
P22 
17    a a=1;b=1;c=1; e= a|(b&~c) 
P23 
18    {} c=0;g=0;i=0;d=0; e=(~c&d)|(c&g)|(c&~i&~g&d) 
P25 
19   d,g c, d, g c=1;g=1;i=1;d=1; e=(~c&d)|(c&g)|(c&~i&~g&d) 
P26 
20  i,c*  i, c, g c=1;g=0;i=1;d=1; e=(~c&d)|(c&g)|(c&~i&~g&d) 
P27 
21    a,c,d a=1;b=1;c=1;d=b&~c;e=a&~d  
P29 
22   d 
c,g,d  or  
c,g,d,f c=1;a=1;f=0;g=c&~f;d=g;b=a&~g;e=d|b 
P38 
23  c*  c,d c=1;a=0;b=0;d=a|b;e=~d&c 
P39 
24  a*  a, d a=1;c=1;d=0 ; e= a&~d  
P40 
25  a*  a,d,f a=1;g=0;c=1;b=g|c;d=c;f=b&~d;e=a&~f 
P41 
26   a,d,f a,c,d,f a=1;g=1;c=1;b=g&~c;d=c;f=b|d;e=a|f 
P42 
27   d,g c,d,g f=1;c=1;a=1;d=c;b=~c&a;g=d|b;e=~g&f 
P43 
28    h,c,d,i,g h=1;f=1;c=1;a=1;d=c;b=~c&a;i=d|b;g=~i&f;e=~g&h 
P44 
29   a,d a,b,d a=1;c=1;b=｛1 if a&c,2 if a&~c,0 if~a};d=(b==1);f=(b==2);e=d|f${'b':{0,1,2}} 
P45 
30   a,f a,b,f a=1;c=0;b=｛1 if a&c,2 if a&~c,0 if~a};d=(b==1);f=(b==2);e=d|f${'b':{0,1,2}} 
P46 
31    a,b,c,d a=1;c=1;b=a;d=c&b;f=~c&b;e=d 
P47 
32    a,b,d a=1;c=0;b=a;f=c;d=a&~c;e=(b&d)|(d&f)|(b&f) 
P14b 
33    a,b c=1;a=1;f=1;g=c&~f;d=g;b=a&~g;e=d|b 
P38b 
34   a,b [] a=0;b=1;e= a&~b 
G12.world2 
35    [] a=0;b=a;e=a&~b 
G13.world2 
36   b a,f f=1;a=f; g=1; b=g&~a; e = (a&~b)|(~a&b) 
G16.world1 
37    b,g f=0;a=f; g=1; b=g&~a; e = (a&~b)|(~a&b) 
G16.world2 
38    b,g f=1;a=f; g=1; b=g&a; e = (a&~b)|(~a&b) 
G17.world1 
39   b [] f=0;a=f; g=1; b=g&a ;e = (a&~b)|(~a&b) 
G17.world2 
40  a* a,c,b,d a,d a=1;b=0;c=1;d= b&~c;e=a&~d 
G19.e4.4b 
41  a a a,c a=1;c=1;d=a&~c;e=(a&d)|(d&c)|(a&c) 
P14c 
42   b,f b,c,f a=1;b=1;c=1;d=a&~c;f=b&c;e=d|f 
 
43  {}  b c=1;a=~c;b=c;e= a|b 
W.e6 
44    b,g f=1;a=f; g=1; b=g&a; e=(a&b)|(~a&~b) 
W.e7 
45   {} c,f f=1;c=f;g=1;a=g&~c;e=a|c 
W.e1 
46   {} c,d a=1;c=1;d=c;b= a&~d; e=b|d 
W.e3 
47    c a=1;b=0;c=1;e=(a&b)|c 
W.e5 
48    {} f=1;g=1;a=f;b= g&a;e=~a&b 
W.e11 
49  c,m {} m   m=1;c=1;e= (m==1)|(c&(m!=2))${'m':{0,1,2}} 
W.e8 
50   {} v,w,m v=1; w=1 ; m=v+w ; e=(m>=1) ${'m':{0,1,2}} 
W.e4 
51  a,c,b {} b,c a=1;b=-1;c=-1;e=(a==b)|(b==c)|(a==c) $ {'a':{-1,0,1},'b':{-1,0,1},'c':{-1,0,1}}   
W.e9 
52  a,c,b,f a a,c,f a=1;b=1;c=1;f={2 if a&c, 1 if b&~c, 0 if~((a&c)|(b&~c))}; e = (f>0)$ {'f':{0,1,2}} 
W.e12 
53  a,b a,d a,b,c,d c=5;a=10;b=a-c;d = c;e =(d+b>=10)${'a':{0,10}, 'c':{0,5},'d':{0,5}, 'b':{-5, 0, 5, 10}} 
P15 
54   a,c,b,d a,b,c,d c=10;a=10;d=c-a/2;b=a-c/2;e=(b+d>=10)${ 'a':{0,10},'c':{0,10},'b':{-5,0,5,10},'d':{-5,0,5,10}} 
P16 
55    a,b c=10;a=10;b=a-c/2;e=(b>0)$ {'a':{0,10},'c':{0,10},'b':{-5,0,5}} 
P17 
56    c c=7;d=4;e = {0 if c==0&d==0, 3+c%3 if c/3>=d/3, 3+d%3 if c/3<d/3} ${'c': {0,7,8}, 'd': {0,4,5}} 
P34 
57  c,d {} c 
c=7;d=4;e = {0 if c==0&d==0, 3+c%3 if c/3>=d/3, 3+d%3 if c/3<d/3} ${'c': {0,4,5,7,8}, 'd': 
{0,4,5,7,8}} 
P34b 
58    c c=8;d=5;e = {0 if c==0&d==0, 3+c%3 if c/3>=d/3, 3+d%3 if c/3<d/3} ${'c': {0,7,8}, 'd': {0,4,5}} 
P37 
59    c c=9;d=5;e={c if c>0, d+4 if c==0&d>0, 0 if c==0&d==0}; $ {'c':{0,9,10,11},'d':{0,5,6,7}} 
P30 
60   {} c,f 
c=9;d=5;f= {((c-c%4)/4-(d-d%4)/4)*4+c%4 if c/4>d/4, 0 if c/4<=d/4}; 
 g={((d-d%4)/4-(c-c%4)/4)*4+d%4 if c/4<=d/4, 0 if c/4>d/4};  
e={8+f%4 if f/4>=g/4, 8+g%4@f/4<g/4}; 
$ {'c':{0,9,10,11},'d':{0,5,6,7},'f':{0,5,6,7,9,10,11},'g':{0,5,6,7}} 
P31 
61  a,c,d a a,c 
c=7;d=4;a= {c if c/3>=d/3, d if c/3<d/3};b={d if c/3>=d/3, c if c/3<d/3};f=3+b%3; 
e= 3+a%3 ${'c':{0,6,7,8},'d':{0,3,4,5},'a':{0,6,7,8},'b':{0,3,4,5}} 
P32 
62    d 
c=9;d=5;h={0 if c*d==0, 1 if (c*d!=0)&((c%4!=d%4)|(c/4<d/4)), 2 if (c*d!=0)&( c/4>=d/4) 
&(c%4==d%4)}; 
b = d* (1 -h%2);a=  c*(1-h/2);g = {(b/4-a/4)*4+b%4 if b/4>a/4, 0 if b/4<=a/4}; 
 f ={(a/4-b/4)*4+a%4 if a/4>b/4,0 if a/4<=b/4};e = {8+f%4 if f/4>=g/4, 8+g%4 if f/4<g/4}  
${'c':{0,9,10,11},'d':{0,5,6,7},'h':{0,1,2},'a':{0,9,10,11},'b':{0,5,6,7},'f':{0,5,6,7,9,10,11},'g':{0,5,6,7}} 
P33 
63    c c =7; e=6+c%3 ${'c': {0,7,8}} 
P35 
64    d d =4; e=6+d%3 ${'d': {0,4,5}} 
P36 
65    a,c,b a=15;b=1;c= (a/15)*(15+b);d=c/15;e=(c%15)==1 $ {'a':{0,15},'c':{0,15,16}} 
P48 
66   {} c,b a=15;b=2;c= (a/15)*(15+b);d=c/15;e=(c%15)==1 $ {'a':{0,15},'c':{0,15,16}} 
P49 
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